<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" style="text-align:justify;" width="90%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #025</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><div style="text-align:justify;"><p>The Opinions handed down on the <span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>11th day of April, 2000</strong></span>, are as follows: </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY CALOGERO, C.J. </strong></span><strong>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/98ka0398.opn.pdf">1998-KA- 0398 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DAN L. BRIGHT</a> (Parish of Orleans)<br />(First Degree Murder)<br />For the reasons assigned, we set aside the defendant's first degree murder conviction and death sentence. We hereby modify the jury's verdict of guilty of first degree murder and render a judgment of guilty of second degree murder. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 821(E). We remand the case to the district court for sentencing of the defendant on the modified judgment to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as provided for in La.Rev. Stat. 14:30.1(B).<br />CONVICTION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER AND DEATH SENTENCE SET ASIDE; JUDGMENT OF GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER RENDERED; REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AT HARD LABOR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PAROLE, PROBATION, OR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE.</p><p>LEMMON, J., not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, §3.</p><p> </p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/98ka0406.opn.pdf">1998-KA- 0406 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PHILLIP ANTHONY</a> (Parish of Orleans)<br />(First Degree Murder)<br />For the reasons assigned herein, defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes final on direct review when either: (1) the defendant fails to petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari; or (2) the Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either (a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari, fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under its prevailing rules for rehearing of denial of certiorari, or (b) that Court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial judge shall, upon receiving notice from this court under La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 923 of finality on direct appeal, and before signing the warrant of execution, as provided by La. Rev. Stat. 15:567(B), immediately notify the Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance Board and provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under La. Rev. Stat. 15:149.1; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raises in that original application, if filed, in the state courts.</p><p>KIMBALL, J., not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, §3. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY MARCUS, J. </span>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99k1849.opn.pdf">1999-K- 1849 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ROBERT M. MYERS A/K/A ROBERT WILLIAMS</a> (Parish of Orleans) <br />(Manslaughter, Two Counts)<br />For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of appeal's judgment reversing defendant's conviction and sentence for Officer Thomas, and affirm his conviction and sentence for that offense. We affirm the court of appeal's judgment reversing defendant's conviction and sentence for Jessie Lopez.</p><p>KNOLL, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, §3.</p><p> </p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99c2402.opn.pdf">1999-C- 2402 DANIEL J. BOUTTE AND HIS WIFE, SANDRA BOUTTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD S. B., AND HIS SONS, D. J. B., JR. AND E. M., III v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1, D/B/A WEST JEFFERSON GENERAL HOSPITAL, CHARITY HOSPITAL IN NEW ORLEANS, JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2, D/B/A EAST JEFFERSON GENERAL HOSPITAL, HOTEL DIEU HOSPITAL AND DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, INC. D/B/A DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, ST. LOUIS, U.S.A.</a> (Parish of Jefferson)<br />For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and set aside. The judgment of the trial court sustaining the exception of prescription filed by Hotel Dieu Hospital is reinstated; however, the case is remanded to the trial court to allow plaintiffs fifteen days from the finality of this judgment to amend their petition to plead the unconstitutionality of the statutes at issue. In default of such amendment, plaintiffs' suit is dismissed. If the plaintiffs elect to amend, the district court shall conduct further proceedings according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed. Costs in this court are assessed against the plaintiffs and the assessment of other costs is to await the final outcome of the suit.</p><p>JOHNSON, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, §3. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY LEMMON, J. </span>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99c2573.opn.pdf">1999-C- 2573 LEE CARRIER AND HIS WIFE MARY BETH CARRIER v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY</a> (Parish of Lafayette)<br />For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment on the issue of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in favor of plaintiffs, Leer Carrier and his wife, Mary Beth Carrier, and intervenor, Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, is reversed, the motions for summary judgment are denied, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.</p><p>KNOLL, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part II, §3. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY KIMBALL, J. </span>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99k1803.opn.pdf">1999-K- 1803 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. COBY MYERS</a> (Parish of Jefferson)<br />(Simple Burglary)<br />For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial judge erred in not addressing defense counsel's Batson objections and this error raises serious federal constitutional equal protection issues affecting the rights of both the defendant and the excused venirepersons. Thus, defendant's conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p>CALOGERO, C.J., not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, §3. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY VICTORY, J. </span>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99k1283.opn.pdf">1999-K- 1283 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BENJY WELCH</a> (Parish of Ascension)<br />(Molestation of a Juvenile)<br />For the reasons stated, the defendant's conviction and sentence are reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p>MARCUS, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, §3. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY TRAYLOR, J. </strong></span><strong>:</strong></p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/98ka3118.opn.pdf">1998-KA- 3118 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JESSIE D. HOFFMAN</a> (Parish of St. Tammany) <br />(First Degree Murder)<br />For the reasons assigned herein, Hoffman's conviction and sentence are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes final on direct review when either: (1) the Defendant fails to petition timely the United Supreme Court for certiorari; or (2) that Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either (a) the Defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari, fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under its prevailing rules for rehearing of denial of certiorari, or (b) that Court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial judge shall, upon receiving notice from this Court under La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15:567(B), immediately notify the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board and provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under La. Rev. Stat. 15:149.1; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raised in that original application, if filed, in state courts.</p><p>MARCUS, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, §3.</p><p> </p><p><a href="/opinions/2000/99c1730.opn.pdf">1999-C- 1730 ROLAND GIBSON, JESSIE GIBSON, ROLAND GIBSON, JR. AND DENNIS GIBSON v. THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, JOHN ST. JOHN AND LLOYD WEST</a> (Parish of Orleans)<br />Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Police had probable cause to believe Gibson had committed first degree murder and were therefore justified in arresting him. The trial court and court of appeal erred in assessing any fault to the City. Therefore, we reverse the portions of the rulings of the civil court and court of appeal finding the Police liable for false arrest based upon a lack of probable cause.<br />REVERSED.</p><p>JOHNSON, J., not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, §3.<br />CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and will assign reasons.<br /><a href="/opinions/2000/99c1730.htl.pdf">LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.</a></p><p> </p><p> </p></div>