<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" width="90%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #027</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><div style="text-align:justify;"><p>The Opinions handed down on the <span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>12th day of April, 2005</strong></span>, are as follows:</p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY CALOGERO, C.J. </strong></span>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04c1459.opn.pdf">2004-C- 1459 C/W 2004-C- 1460 C/W 2004-C- 1466 DARRELL SUIRE v. LAFAYETTE CITY-PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT,ET AL. </a> (Parish of Lafayette)<br />Having addressed all the parties' assignments of error, our disposition of this case is as follows:<br />We reverse the court of appeal's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the absolute liability claim involving the installation of metal sheeting. We reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the City and Boh Brothers on this claim.<br />We reverse the court of appeal's judgment that, under the contractual indemnity provision, Boh Brothers owed a duty to defend the City and Dubroc against the absolute liability claim. We hold that Boh Brothers' obligation to indemnify or defend any party under the provisions of the indemnity agreement may not be determined until the conclusion of the lawsuit.<br />We reverse the court of appeal's judgment that National Union owed a duty to defend and/or indemnify Dubroc against the absolute liability claim. We affirm the court of appeal's judgment that National Union owed a duty to defend the City as an additional insured against the absolute liability claim. We remand this claim to the trial court for a determination of the actual cost of defense on the absolute liability claim alone. Having disposed of the absolute liability claim by summary judgment, we find that the City's indemnity claim against National Union is moot.<br />We affirm the court of appeal's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims against Dubroc.<br />We reverse the court of appeal's judgment overturning the trial court's pro-City grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim and reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the City on this claim. We affirm the court of appeal's reversal of summary judgment on the plaintiff's detrimental reliance and expropriation claims.<br />We remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.<br />AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.</p><br /><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04c1544.opn.pdf">2004-C- 1544 ALL STAR ADVERTISING AGENCY, INC. D/B/A ALL STAR AUTOMOTIVE GROUP v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION</a> (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)<br />Accordingly, the court of appeal's judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the plaintiff's unaddressed contention that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in the order of liquidation did not assert exclusive jurisdiction over a lawsuit such as the plaintiff brings here, that is, one for injunctive relief in which is sought the production of documents supporting the defendant's demand for premiums due and an injunction preventing the defendant from drawing down on a letter of credit.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY KIMBALL, J. </strong></span>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04c2482.opn.pdf">2004-C- 2482 DR. JUDITH FISHBEIN, M.D. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER AND TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA</a> (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)<br />For the reasons assigned, we conclude that plaintiff's claim is one for the recovery of compensation for services rendered and, as such, is subject to the three-year prescriptive period provided in La. C.C.art. 3494. Thus, when plaintiff filed suit on August 7, 2000, any claims she had for recovery of compensation for services rendered prior to August 7, 1997, were prescribed; however, her suit was timely filed with respect to those claims for recovery of compensation for services rendered that accrued between August 7, 1997, and July 1, 1998. As to those claims that have not prescribed, we find that plaintiff's supplemental salary was included in the definition of earnable compensation. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is remanded to the district court for further proceedings and with instructions. The judgment of the court of appeal is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part.<br />AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.</p><p>VICTORY, J., concurs with reasons.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY JOHNSON, J. </strong></span>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/03ka0897.opn.pdf">2003-KA- 0897 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GREGORY C. BROWN </a>(Parish of E. Baton Rouge)<br />For the reasons assigned, the defendant's convictions and death sentence are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes final on direct review when either: (1) defendant fails to petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari; or (2) that court denies his petition for certiorari; and either (a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari, fails to petition the United States Supreme Court timely, under its prevailing rules, for rehearing of denial of certiorari; or (b) that court denies his petition for rehearing, the trial judge shall, upon receiving notice from this Court under La.C.Cr.P. art. 923 of finality of direct appeal, and before signing the warrant of execution as provided by La.R.S. 15:567(B), immediately notify the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board and provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under La. R.S. 15:149.1; and (2) to litigate expeditiously the claims raised in that original application, if filed in the state courts.<br />AFFIRMED.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY VICTORY, J. </strong></span>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04cc2124.opn.pdf">2004-CC-2124 RON JOHNSON v. MARRERO-ESTELLE VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY NO. 1 </a>(Parish of Jefferson)<br />For the reasons expressed herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed.<br />AFFIRMED.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY TRAYLOR, J. </span></strong>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04c1833.opn.pdf">2004-C -1833 SABINE PARISH POLICE JURY v. COMMISSIONER OF ALCOHOL & TOBACCO CONTROL C/W SABINE MANUFACTURING, INC. v. SABINE PARISH POLICE JURY & SHERIFF GUFFEY PATTISON</a> (Parish of Sabine)<br />Based on the foregoing, we find that the provisions of La. R.S. 26:583 dictate that a ward, or a portion thereof, must take on the local option sales characteristics of the election district which it comprises after parish restructuring. The judgment of the court of appeal, which affirmed the decision of the trial court in favor of the Commissioner and Sabine Manufacturing, is affirmed.<br />AFFIRMED.</p><p>VICTORY, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.<br />KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.<br />WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY KNOLL, J. </strong></span>:</p><p><a href="/opinions/2005/04c2252.opn.pdf">2004-C- 2252 C/W 2004-C- 2257 DONALD E. O'BRIEN AND CAROL O'BRIEN v. DR. AKBAR RIZVI, DR. ARTHUR CARL PLAUTZ, JR., ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY AND CGH COMPANIES, INC. (Formerly CompHealth, Inc.)</a> (Parish of Rapides)<br />For the above and forgoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and set aside. The Board's petition for intervention is hereby granted and the judgment of the trial court denying the defendants' exception of prematurity is reinstated. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p> </p><p> </p></div>