<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" width="90%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #076</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><p style="text-align:justify;">The Opinions handed down on the <span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>1st day of December, 2009</strong></span>, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY JOHNSON, J.:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/08KP2253.opn.pdf">2008-KP-2253 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JUSTIN MALONE</a> (Parish of Calcasieu)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the above reasons, we find that the court of appeal correctly denied the defendant’s writ application as moot. We hold that, based on the facts presented, and in keeping with our decisions in Morris and Verdin, the defendant’s voluntary payment of the fine imposed as a misdemeanor sentence prior to applying for appellate review, and without recording any objection to the fine, renders any subsequent review of the conviction or sentence moot. <br />AFFIRMED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">KIMBALL, C.J., dissents.<br />KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.<br />WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09CC0951.opn.pdf">2009-CC-0951 ROBERT H. TITUS, II v. IHOP RESTAURANT, INC., ET AL.</a> (Parish of Lafayette)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the lower courts and grant the Peremptory Exception of Prescription. <br />REVERSED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY VICTORY, J.:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09KA0477.opn.pdf">2009-KA-0477 IN THE INTEREST OF A. J.</a> (Parish of Orleans)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. <br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY WEIMER, J.:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/08KA2204.opn.pdf">2008-KA-2204 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TYRONE JEFFERSON</a> (Parish of Orleans)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court granting the defendant’s motion to quash and declaring LSA-R.S. 40:966(E)(2) unconstitutional, and remand for further proceedings. <br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09C0935.opn.pdf">2009-C -0935 MICHAEL X. ST. MARTIN, LOUIS ROUSSEL, III, WILLIAM A. NEILSON, ET AL. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA; AND CYNTHIA BRIDGES, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE</a> (Parish of Terrebonne)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Consequently, we hold that the Board has the authority to proceed with a class certification hearing and, if appropriate, with a class action in this particular case. Thus, we vacate the appellate court judgment that reinstated the Board’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ petition for class certification; we reinstate the district court ruling that found the Board had jurisdiction over a class action proceeding; and we remand this matter to the Board for a determination of the class certification issue pursuant to the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. art. 591, et seq.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JUDGMENT VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED TO THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY GUIDRY, J.:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09KK1589.opn.pdf">2009-KK-1589 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MILTON HUNT</a> (Parish of Orleans)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JOHNSON, J., dissents.<br />VICTORY, J., concurs.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>PER CURIAMS:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09K0630.opn.pdf">2009-K -0630 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MASON GODFREY</a> (Parish of Calcasieu)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">The decision below is therefore reversed, the defendant’s conviction for public intimidation and retaliation, and his habitual offender sentence are reinstated, and this case is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of his assignments of error relating to his habitual offender adjudication pretermitted on original appeal. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JOHNSON, J., dissent.<br />JONES, J., I respectfully dissent.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09C0817.opn.pdf">2009-C -0817 KATRINA WYMAN AND JASON WYMAN v. DUPEPE CONSTRUCTION, MONTEFORTE'S ROOFING & SIDING, ROBERT MONTEFORTE, BANKERS INSURANCE CO., AND USAA INSURANCE</a> (Parish of Jefferson)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Considering this well established jurisprudence, we find the court of appeal erred in failing to allow the Wymans an opportunity to amend their petition in Wyman II to allege facts which may possibly establish their claim is not prescribed. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal, but amend the judgment to remand this case to the district court to allow the Wymans to amend their petition, if they can, in Wyman II within the delay allowed by the district court and to allege facts that would show their claim is not prescribed. <br />JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; CASE REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09CC1013.opn.pdf">2009-CC-1013 THEODORE E. FILIPSKI, III v. IMPERIAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INS. CO., ET AL.</a> (Parish of Calcasieu)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court, insofar as it denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company on the issue of uninsured motorist coverage, is reversed. The motion for summary judgment is hereby granted in its entirety, and plaintiff’s suit against Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company is dismissed with prejudice. All costs in this court are assessed against plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09B1185.opn.pdf">2009-B -1185 IN RE: ADAM F. HUTTON</a></p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Adam F. Hutton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25718, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2009/09B1631.opn.pdf">2009-B -1631 IN RE: ROBERT E. CLARK</a></p><p style="text-align:justify;">Judge Benjamin Jones, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, assigned as Justice Pro Tempore, participating in the decision.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Robert E. Clark, Louisiana Bar Roll number 1766, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years, with credit for the time served on interim suspension from June 22, 2007 through January 9, 2008. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">WEIMER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.</p><p> </p>