<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" width="90%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #042</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><p align="justify" style="text-align:justify;">The Opinions handed down on the <span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>1st day of July, 2011</strong></span>, are as follows:</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY KIMBALL, C.J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C2516.opn.pdf">2010-C -2516 CHARLES EBINGER, ET UX. v. VENUS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ET AL.</a> (Parish of Lafayette)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, the court of appeal’s ruling is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. <br />REVERSED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C2779.opn.pdf">2010-C -2779 DESI FULMER v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES AND GARY PIERCE</a> (Parish of Plaquemines)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons set forth above, we find that claims against the State under the Jones Act brought by state-employed seamen are not prohibited under the LWCA or the Louisiana Constitution. Louisiana has consented through Article XII Section 10 to suits for personal injury, and has not limited that waiver for suits brought by state employees under the Jones Act. We further find the court of appeal was correct in finding that plaintiff has stated a valid cause of action against the State under the Jones Act. The court of appeal did not err in denying the State’s exception of no cause of action. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the court of appeal in this case. <br />AFFIRMED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY JOHNSON, J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10KA2804.opn.pdf">2010-KA-2804 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRYAN GOLSTON C/W STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PAUL BAKER C/W STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CALVIN WATSON C/W STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LLOYD DELL C/W STATE OF LOUISIANA v. REGINALD JACKSON</a> (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the above reasons, we reverse the district court’s finding that La. R.S. 15:560 et seq. is unconstitutionally vague. We find R.S. 15:560 et seq. to be a regulatory, rather than criminal statutory scheme, and thus not subject to a void for vagueness analysis. Further, even applying a due process analysis, we find no due process violations. The SOAP statutory scheme provides offenders with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a court hearing to determine SVP or CSP status. Additionally, we find the statutory definitions constitutionally sufficient to allow the panel to make its recommendation and the court to make a determination of SVP or CSP status.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY VICTORY, J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C1908.opn.pdf">2010-C -1908 LOLA BROOKS, BRIDGETTE GOSNAY, AND JESSE BROOKS, JR. v. THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT</a>(Parish of Iberville)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant. <br />REVERSED AND RENDERED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.<br />KNOLL, J., concurs and assigns reasons.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C2329.opn.pdf">2010-C -2329 DANIEL ARCENEAUX, LOUIS DAVEREDE, JR., VIVES LEMMON AND JULES MENESSES v. AMSTAR CORPORATION, AMSTAR SUGAR CORPORATION, TATE AND LYLE NORTH AMERICAN SUGARS, INC., AND DOMINO SUGAR COMPANY</a> (Parish of St. Bernard)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed in part judgment is rendered against Continental in the amount of $174,090.92 for indemnity for the post-denial plaintiffs’ settlements. The case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether 12 claimants met the settlement criteria and the amount due each and the amount of attorney fees due for late payment of defense costs, each determination to be made in accordance with the directives of this opinion. <br />REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY KNOLL, J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C2775.opn.pdf">2010-C -2775 MARGIE MCGLOTHLIN, ET AL. v. CHRISTUS ST. PATRICK HOSPITAL</a> (Parish of Calcasieu)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is hereby reversed and the judgment of the District Court is reinstated. <br />REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JOHNSON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.<br />GUIDRY, J., concurs.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY WEIMER, J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10CC2608.opn.pdf">2010-CC-2608 SHAWN BURNETT v. JAMES CONSTRUCTION GROUP, THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT</a> (Parish of St. Tammany)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, that portion of the court of appeal’s decision that granted DOTD’s motion for involuntary dismissal is reversed. That portion of the appellate court decision sustaining DOTD’S exception of insufficiency of service of process is affirmed but amended so as to allow Burnett a reasonable period of time, to be set by the trial court on remand of this matter, in which to cure the defect in service. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.<br />REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AS AMENDED; AND REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10C2828cw11C0039.opn.pdf">2010-C -2828 C/W 2011-C -0039 B.W. GREEMON v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, LOUISIANA AND THE BOSSIER CITY MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD</a> (Parish of Bossier)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Because Mr. Greemon failed to bring a timely claim under the Open Meetings Law, the district court erred in granting summary judgment under that law. The judgment of the district court granting Mr. Greemon’s motion for summary judgment and voiding the Civil Service Board’s action is therefore reversed. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11CC0040.opn.pdf">2011-CC-0040 REGINA MARIE WHITLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF CHANCE WHITLEY (D) v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ON BEHALF OF THE MEDICAL CENTER OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS-UNIVERSITY CAMPUS</a> (Parish of Orleans)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeal’s decision is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.<br />AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY GUIDRY, J.:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11O0417.opn.pdf">2011-O -0417 IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE KEVIN J. HOFFMAN, WARD A, PARISH OF ST. BERNARD, STATE OF LOUISIANA</a> (Judiciary Commission of Louisiana)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, Justice of the Peace Hoffman is ordered to pay a civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, in the amount of $200.00, no later than thirty days from the finality of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11O0418.opn.pdf">2011-O -0418 IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE CHARLES FLAHERTY, DISTRICT 3, PARISH OF LASALLE, STATE OF LOUISIANA</a> (Judiciary Commission of Louisiana)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, Justice of the Peace Flaherty is ordered to pay a civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, in the amount of $200.00, no later than thirty days from the finality of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11CJ0548.opn.pdf">2011-CJ-0548 JASON TED GRAY v. CHRISTY LYNN WINNON GRAY</a> (Parish of Morehouse)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, for the reasons given above, we affirm the result of the judgment of the court of appeal. The stay previously issued by this court is now lifted. The matter is remanded to the trial court, which is directed to issue the appropriate orders consistent with this opinion to transfer domiciliary custody to the father and to establish a visitation schedule. <br />AFFIRMED, STAY LIFTED, AND REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.</p><p style="text-align:justify;">JOHNSON, J., concurs in result.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11O0572.opn.pdf">2011-O -0572 IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE RANDY THOMAS, JR., DISTRICT B, RED RIVER PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA</a> (Judiciary Commission of Louisiana)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, Justice of the Peace Thomas is ordered to pay a civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, in the amount of $200.00, no later than thirty days from the finality of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>BY CLARK, J.:</strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11O0214.opn.pdf">2011-O -0214 IN RE: JUDGE REGINALD T. BADEAUX, III, TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA</a> (Judiciary Commission of Louisiana)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that Judge Reginald T. Badeaux, III be publicly censured for violating Canons 2A, 3A(1), 3A(6), and 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Reginald T. Badeaux, III is further ordered to reimburse the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana the sum of $1,439.15 in costs.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><span style="text-decoration:underline;"><strong>PER CURIAM:<br /></strong></span></p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10K1799.pc.pdf">2010-K -1799 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MERVIN PATRICK WHITE</a> (Parish of Jefferson)<br />(Driving While Intoxicated - Fourth Offense or Subsequent)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and defendant’s sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, or parole, is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence, in connection with which the court shall issue an amended commitment clarifying that the sentence imposed pursuant to La. R.S. 14:98 (E) (4) (9), is without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, or parole for the entire 20-year term of imprisonment. <br />COURT OF APPEAL DECISION REVERSED; SENTENCE REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/10K2421.pc.pdf">2010-K -2421 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOHN W. MATHIEU</a> (Parish of Jefferson)<br />(Second Degree Kidnapping)</p><p style="text-align:justify;">The decision of the Fifth Circuit is therefore reversed, defendant’s conviction and sentence are reinstated and affirmed in light of the court of appeal’s rejection of his other assignments of error on original appeal, Mathieu, 06-0946 at 18-23, 960 So.2d at 308-10, and this case is remanded to the district court for purposes of execution of sentence. <br />COURT OF APPEAL DECISION REVERSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11B0070.pc.pdf">2011-B -0070 IN RE: FRANK E. BROWN, JR.</a></p><p style="text-align:justify;">Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Frank E. Brown, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 3555, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year. It is further ordered that all but three months of this suspension shall be deferred. Upon completion of the active portion of his suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period of two years subject to the condition that he successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School program. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11B0331.pc.pdf">2011-B -0331 IN RE: HENRY DILLON, III</a></p><p style="text-align:justify;">Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that the name of Henry A. Dillon, III, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23038, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p style="text-align:justify;"> </p><p style="text-align:justify;"><a href="/opinions/2011/11B0390.pc.pdf">2011-B -0390 IN RE: CARLA GASTON</a></p><p style="text-align:justify;">Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Carla M. Gaston, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25777, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law for six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation. During the probationary period, respondent shall attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. It is further ordered that respondent make restitution to Toni Welch in the amount of $1,330.07 and resolve the fee dispute with Jane Johns through the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Lawyer Fee Dispute Resolution Program. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p> </p>