<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" style="" width="90%"><tbody style=""><tr style="" valign="top"><td style="" valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #014</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><p>The Opinions handed down on the <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">26th day of March, 2019</span></strong>, are as follows:</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">BY GUIDRY, J.</span></strong>: </p><p><a href="../../opinions/2019/18-0534.CA.OPN.pdf">2018-CA-0534 JUSTIN ULRICH, GWEN ULRICH, RAYMOND AND PAM ALLEMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. KIMBERLY ROBINSON, SECRETARY LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE</a> (Parish of E. Baton Rouge)</p><p>This is a direct appeal from the district court’s judgment declaring unconstitutional 2015 La. Acts, No. 131, § 1, which amended La. Rev. Stat. 47:6030 by placing a cap on the total amount of solar electric system income tax credits available to Louisiana taxpayers, because it retroactively deprived the plaintiffs of a vested property right and substantially impaired the obligations of private contracts. The district court also implicitly found the plaintiffs had standing to bring the constitutional claim and that a justiciable controversy existed because the constitutional issue was not moot. For the reasons set forth below, we find the district court erred in overruling the Department of Revenue’s peremptory exception of mootness. REVERSED.</p><p>HUGHES, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><p><strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">PER CURIAM</span></strong>:</p><p><a href="../../opinions/2019/17-0100.K.OPN.pdf">2017-K-0100 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KHOI Q. HOANG</a> (Parish of Orleans)</p><p>Here, from all of the evidence presented, a jury could reasonably infer (without speculating) that defendant removed the truck’s license plate or directed someone else to do so because the truck was going to be used in a murder or had just been used in a murder. Thus, the majority of the panel of court below erred in finding that “circumstantial evidence connecting Defendant to the removal of the license plate was nonexistent.” Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal’s decision and reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice. REVERSED.</p><p>JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.<br />WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><p><a href="../../opinions/2019/18-1799.B.OPN.pdf">2018-B-1799 IN RE: DORIS MCWHITE WESTON</a></p><p>Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Doris McWhite Weston, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26419, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in this opinion. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC sign a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with these conditions, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p align="justify" style="margin-top:0;"><br /></p><p style="margin-bottom:0;"> </p>
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