<table cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0" width="90%"><tbody><tr valign="top"><td valign="top" width="63%">FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE</td><td valign="top" width="37%"><div align="right">NEWS RELEASE #011</div></td></tr><tr valign="top"><td valign="top">FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA</td><td valign="top"> </td></tr></tbody></table><p> </p><div class="nrbody"><style>.nrbody h1{ display:block; font-size:1em; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; } .nrbody p { text-align:justify; } </style> <p> </p><p>The Opinions handed down on the <span style="text-decoration:underline;font-weight:bold;">3rd day of April, 2020</span> are as follows:</p><h1>BY Johnson, C.J.:</h1><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-0637.C.OPN.pdf">2019-C-00637 JACOB STEVENSON, JESSE STEVENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, LOGAN STEVENSON VS. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY AND ANTHONY J. LEBLANC</a> (Parish of Terrebonne)<br />We granted this writ to determine whether plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to fax file a petition on the last day of the prescriptive period after the clerk of court’s business hours, but before midnight, interrupted prescription where the clerk of court’s policy was to turn off the fax machines when the office closed. The district court sustained defendants’ exception of prescription and the court of appeal affirmed. For the following reasons, we reverse the rulings of the lower courts.<br />REVERSED.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p>Weimer, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.<br />Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><h1>BY Crichton, J.:</h1><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-0795.CC.OPN.pdf">2019-CC-00795 GEORGE BLAIR VS. MARY CONEY, AMERISOURCEBERGEN DRUG CORPORATION, ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION (UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST)</a> (Parish of Livingston)<br />We granted the writ in this matter to address whether the court of appeal erred in summarily reversing the district court’s order excluding the testimony of Dr. Charles E. “Ted” Bain. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Dr. Bain’s testimony was not based on sufficient facts or data, as required by C.E. art. 702(A)(2), we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the district court.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p>Weimer, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.<br />Crain, J., dissents.</p><p> </p><h1>BY Genovese, J.:</h1><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-1445.KA.OPN.pdf">2019-KA-01445 STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF D.T.</a> (Parish of Jefferson)<br />In this case, the State has charged D.T. with aggravated battery committed with a firearm and seeks to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction and to prosecute D.T. as an adult pursuant to Louisiana Children’s Code Article 305(B)(2)(j). In opposition, D.T. filed a motion with the juvenile court to declare La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) unconstitutional. The juvenile court granted D.T.’s motion. Pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D), the State sought direct review with this Court. Thus, the narrow issue before us is whether La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j), providing for divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction when the child has been charged with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, is unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling that the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in creating an exception allowing divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction for a child charged with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, where that charge is not among the crimes enumerated in La. Const. art. V, § 19.<br />AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. </p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p> </p><h1>BY Crain, J.:</h1><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-1162.C.OPN.pdf">2019-C-01162 NEVILLE KIRT; ALVIN KIRT; AND LAMONT KIRT, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ELAINE KIRT, DECEASED VS. REBECCA C. METZINGER, M.D.; THEODORE D. STRICKLAND, III, M.D.; ADMINISTRATORS OF THE TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND D/B/A TULANE; PAULINE TAQUINO, CRNA; GAYLE MARTIN, CRNA; PARISH ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, LTD, A PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CORPORATION</a> (Parish of Orleans Civil)<br />We granted a writ of certiorari to consider the proper interpretation and application of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1231.8A(1)(e) where a claimant fails to pay the filing fee for adding a defendant to a pending medical review panel proceeding. The trial court found the failure to pay the fee invalidated the proceeding as to all named defendants and granted an<br />exception of prescription. The court of appeal affirmed. We reverse and remand.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p> </p><h1>PER CURIAM:</h1><p><a href="/opinions/2020/17-2155.B.OPN.pdf">2017-B-02155 IN RE: CALEB KENT AGUILLARD</a><br />Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Caleb Kent Aguillard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32087, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. It is further ordered that this suspension shall be deferred in its entirety and that respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period to coincide with the term of his recovery agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. Respondent’s probation shall be conditioned on full compliance with the terms of his JLAP agreement. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p> </p><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-0490.K.OPN.pdf">2019-K-00490 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. CLIFFORD WILLIAMS</a> (Parish of Orleans Criminal)<br />Before trial, the defense was prohibited from introducing evidence of the victim’s juvenile arrest for illegal carrying of a weapon. At trial, the defense unsuccessfully attempted to introduce other evidence of the victim’s character. Specifically, the defense sought to introduce a photograph that depicted the victim holding a gun, evidence that the victim had threatened defendant on social media, and testimony of a witness that the victim had previously threatened defendant. In rejecting defendant’s claim on appeal that the district court erred in excluding this evidence, the court of appeal found that defendant failed to introduce appreciable evidence of a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, as required by La.C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a). See State v. Williams, 18-0445, pp. 19-20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/19), 265 So.3d 902, 917. Defendant<br />contends that the court of appeal erred because testimony of an eyewitness (which is summarized below) constituted appreciable evidence of an overt act by the victim, and the district court overstepped its bounds in evaluating the credibility of this witness to find the evidence was not appreciable because the witness was not credible. We agree. However, for the reasons below, we find the evidence was otherwise inadmissible, and therefore we affirm the conviction and sentence.<br />AFFIRMED.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p> </p><p><a href="/opinions/2020/19-1479.B.OPN.pdf">2019-B-01479 IN RE: GEORGE A. FLOURNOY</a><br />Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that George A. Flournoy, Louisiana Bar Roll number 5620, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. It is further ordered that all but thirty days of the suspension shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period of one year. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. It is further ordered that all investigative costs related to Counts I and III of the formal charges and two-thirds of the total litigation expenses are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p>Johnson, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><p><a href="../../opinions/2020/19-1332.KK.OPN.pdf">2019-KK-01332 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. TRE KING</a> (Parish of Orleans Criminal)<br />We granted the application to determine whether the warning that “you have the right to an attorney, and if you can’t afford one, one will be appointed to you” - without further qualification - is a sufficient advisement of the right to counsel under Miranda. We note that the federal circuits are split on this question, and that the United States Supreme Court has thus far not weighed in. After reviewing the jurisprudence, we find a general advisement like that given in this case suffices, and that a statement need not be suppressed because of the failure to qualify the warning with an additional advisement that the right to counsel exists both before and during questioning. Accordingly, we reverse the rulings of the lower courts, deny defendant’s motion to exclude his statements, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.<br />REVERSED AND REMANDED.</p><p>Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R. Clark.</p><p>Johnson, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.<br />Genovese, J., dissents and assigns reasons.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p></div>